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Informed Consent

Paul McGivern spoke at the Birth Trauma Conference – June 7, 2013

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Paul McGivern  was an invited speaker and a panelist at the Birth Trauma Conference organized by CanLNC and held at the Vancouver Pan Pacific hotel on June 7, 2013. Susanne Raab and Natalia Ivolgina also participated in the conference. The conference featured top lawyers in the province practicing in birth trauma litigation and covered topics such as causes of cerebral palsy, standards of fetal monitoring, challenges in proving causation, and recent developments in the Supreme Court of Canada. Paul shared his knowledge in such areas as the use of experts in medical malpractice cases and recent pronouncements from the Supreme Court.

Paul highlighted the fact that birth trauma lawsuits are highly expert opinion driven which translates into enormous financial stakes for both the family and the law firm involved. Paul shared that in his practice, to minimize the risks he always investigates the case with the experts even before the lawsuit is commenced. Paul also discussed the types of experts usually required to build a winning case and how to work with the experts to ensure that their opinion is unbiased and that they would present as credible witnesses at trial.

Paul discussed the legal significance of Ediger and Cojocaru cases that he had recently won at the Supreme Court of Canada. In both of these cases the Court was critical of the physicians’ failure to properly inform the mothers of the risks involved in the treatment they recommended when obtaining their patients’ consent to the procedures. The Court essentially stated that it is not enough to simply inform the patients of the risks associated with a proposed treatment; it must be explained what these risks mean in terms of real-life consequences should they materialize.

In other words, it is not enough to simply say, “There is a risk of bradycardia” in the context of the facts in Ediger, for instance, where the physician decided to use a mid-level forceps procedure during the delivery. Instead, it must be explained that “there is a small risk of cord compression if I attempt this procedure. Cord compression may deprive your baby of oxygen. We would monitor for potential asphyxiation by paying attention to any signs of fetal bradycardia. However, in the event that cord compression occurs, I may not have enough time to organize an OR room and deliver the baby in time before a permanent brain injury occurs”. In Ediger, the physician did not warn the mother of any risks, and was found liable on the basis of failing to ensure that the emergency back-up was immediately available by calling the operating room before attempting the mid-forceps procedure which happened to be occupied with another surgery.

Similarly, in Cojocaru, the physician was found liable solely on the basis of her failure to bring the significance of the risks home to the mother when she recommended that she attempts vaginal delivery after having had a Cesarean section previously (commonly referred to as VBAC). The physician in Cojocaru only told the mother that there is a 1 in 200 risk of uterine rupture associated with a VBAC; she did not tell the mother that if this risk materializes there is a significant chance of her baby suffering permanent damage because there likely would not be enough time to recognize the signs of uterine rupture, arrange for an emergency Cesarean section and deliver the baby before a permanent brain injury is sustained.

Find full details of the conference here

Find full decision of Cojocaru v. British Columbia Women’s Hospital and Health Centre, 2013 SCC 30 here

Find full decision of Ediger v. Johnston, 2013 SCC 18 here

Paul McGivern Interviewed by Lawyers Weekly

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Paul McGivern  was interviewed by Lawyers Weekly on the significance of the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the case that he argued. The decision was important in two respects: it clarified the threshold for rebutting the presumption of judicial integrity and impartiality and raised the bar for physicians in terms of explaining the risks of the proposed procedure when obtaining informed consent from patients.

The Supreme Court of Canada essentially confirmed, in Paul’s words, “that trial judges are entitled to rely on the lawyers that appear before them, and are entitled to rely on the written submissions that counsel make. They’re entitled to copy from those submissions, and put them into their judgments. But the more complex the case, the more the judge is encouraged to put the reasons into their own words”.

On the issue of informed consent, the decision, according to Paul, “emphasizes the need for physicians to explain to their patients exactly what they’re going to be doing, what the risks are, and most importantly what the potential consequences are if the risk that the procedure entails actually materializes. In other words it isn’t enough to say ‘there might be a uterine rupture.’ You actually have to explain to the patient what that means, in real terms, for the patient. And in this case, what it meant, was it would be unlikely at best that they could rescue the child before brain damage set in.”

Win for an injured infant at the Supreme Court of Canada

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Paul McGivern and Susanne Raab were among the team winning the hard-fought battle at the Supreme Court of Canada for an infant with cerebral palsy injured as a result of a failed attempt at a forceps delivery – April 4, 2013 (Full decision available here)

Paul McGivern  and Susanne Raab were among the four lawyers representing the plaintiff Cassidy Ediger in a birth trauma lawsuit. Cassidy was born on January 24, 1998. The circumstances of her birth were tragic: she was born “flat” (asphyxiated) and had to be resuscitated. She suffered a severe and permanent brain injury during her birth resulting in grave disabilities: spastic quadriplegia and cerebral palsy. As a result of her injuries, she is unable to speak, is tube-fed and uses a wheelchair. Her life expectancy has also been reduced to 38 years of age.

The Trial Decision

After years of investigation and preparation, the case went to trial in spring of 2008. The trial judge’s decision came out in 2009 finding the obstetrician negligent for using the forceps to assist the delivery without explaining the risks of the procedure to Cassidy’s mother when obtaining her consent to the procedure, and failing to ensure that immediate surgical backup was available to deliver Cassidy by cesarean section in the event that the attempt at forceps delivery fails. The placement of the forceps displaced Cassidy’s head allowing the umbilical cord to become compressed during the contractions and leading to bradycardia, a decrease in a baby’s heart rate, which deprived her brain of necessary oxygen. The trial judge awarded $3,224,000 in damages to Cassidy.

The BC Court of Appeal

The defence appealed the decision of the trial judge to the BC Court of Appeal, and the appeal was heard in the fall of 2010. The judgment of the Court of Appeal came out in spring of 2011 overturning the trial judge’s award of damages to Cassidy and dismissing her claim, essentially saying that the trial judge erred in her finding that the forceps procedure caused the bradycardia which led to Cassidy’s injuries.

The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada

Our lawyers did not abandon Cassidy’s claim, but appealed it to the Supreme Court of Canada, which is the final court of appeal in our country and only hears cases of national importance. Before the case is heard by our highest court, the appealing party needs to demonstrate that the case involves an issue of public importance or raises an important issue of law. Out of approximately 600 applications for leave to appeal filed each year, the Supreme Court only hears about 80 cases.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to hear Cassidy’s case and heard the issues in the fall of 2012. In April of 2013, the Supreme Court restored the trial judge’s decision finding the obstetrician liable for Cassidy’s injuries. Cross-appeals about the amount of damages were referred back to the B.C. Court of Appeal for consideration.

Standard of Care

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the trial judge’s finding that Dr. Johnston did not meet the standard of care. The Court stated at para. 53,

[53]…Dr. Johnston was required, before he initiated the forceps procedure, to take reasonable precautions that would have been responsive to the recognized risk of bradycardia and the injury that results if bradycardia persists for more than 10 minutes. Because it is undisputed that Dr. Johnston failed to take these precautions, which would have resulted in a faster delivery and likely prevented injury from bradycardia, the trial judge’s causation finding is sound.

The Supreme Court of Canada also found that the standard of care must be “responsive” to the risks involved.

Causation

The Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed the legal test for causation enunciated in Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R 311 at para. 36,

[36] The Court of Appeal’s reasons also suggest that it understood the trial judge to have improperly relied on Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R 311, in order to draw an “inference of causation” (paras. 83-85). Snell stands for the proposition that the plaintiff in medical malpractice cases – as in any other case – assumes the burden of proving causation on a balance of the probabilities (ibid., at pp. 329-30). Sopinka J. observed that this standard of proof does not require scientific certainty (ibid., at p. 328); Clements, at para. 9. The trier of fact may, upon weighing the evidence, draw an inference against a defendant who does not introduce sufficient evidence contrary to that which supports the plaintiff’s theory of causation. In determining whether the defendant has introduced sufficient evidence, the trier of fact should take into account the relative position of each party to adduce evidence (Snell, at p. 330).

The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that in the face conflicting expert testimony, it was open to the trial judge to accept the plaintiff’s theory of causation over that of the defence having regard to all of the evidence:

[39] Faced with this conflicting expert testimony on the feasibility of the “displacement” theory and evidence of other potential causes, it was incumbent upon Holmes J. to weigh the evidence before her and determine whether Cassidy had proven causation on a balance of the probabilities. Holmes J. ultimately concluded that Cassidy did satisfy this burden for three reasons. First, as already described, Drs. Shone’s and Farquharson’s testimony regarding the physical effects and distortions of labour contractions, as well as the timing of the steps leading up to a cord compression, were consistent with what occurred here. Second, multiple experts testified that mid-level forceps procedures are potentially dangerous and carry the risk of acute cord compression. Third, the close proximity in time of the forceps attempt and the bradycardia supported the conclusion that the forceps attempt was connected to the cord compression. As a result, Holmes J. concluded that, although she could not be certain of the precise mechanics leading to cord compression, “[t]he only reasonable inference from all the evidence is that the mid-forceps attempt likely caused the cord compression that in turn caused the bradycardia” (para. 135).

[40] There was no palpable and overriding error in this conclusion. It was open to Holmes J. to accept Drs. Shone’s and Farquharson’s testimony regarding the displacement theory over Dr. Johnston’s testimony. It was also open to her to conclude that the close proximity in time between the forceps attempt and the bradycardia, combined with the well-recognized risk of bradycardia associated with mid-level forceps deliveries, supported a finding of causation in this case.

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